The creature before the law: Notes on Walter Benjamin's critique of violence by Abbott, Mathew
 
This is the published version of: 
 
Abbott, M. (2008) The creature before the law: Notes on Walter 
Benjamin’s critique of violence. Colloquy: Text Theory Critique, 16, 1-
17. 
 
Available online at 
http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/colloquy/download/colloquy_issue_sixt
een/abbott.pdf 
 
 
  Copyright © 2008 Monash University.  This is an Open Access article 
distributed under the terms of the Creative 
Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits others 
to distribute, remix, adapt, build upon this work non-commercially, and 
license their derivative works on different terms, provided the original 
work is cited and the use is non-commercial. Commercial use is not 
permitted. 
COPYRIGHT NOTICE             
 
 
 
FedUni ResearchOnline 
http://researchonline.federation.edu.au 
 
  
The Creature Before the Law: 
Notes on Walter Benjamin’s Critique of Violence 
Mathew Abbott 
Leopards break into the temple and drink to the 
dregs what is in the sacrificial pitchers; this is 
repeated over and over again; finally it can be 
calculated in advance, and it becomes part of 
the ceremony. 
Kafka, Parables and Paradoxes 
Transforming as it does from an exemplar of meticulous philosophical 
analysis into an allusive political/messianic tract, Walter Benjamins Cri-
tique of Violence is representative of all that is most difficult about his 
work. Against those critics who find the eschatological dimensions of Ben-
jamins texts unpalatable and/or philosophically bankrupt,1 however, the 
wager of this paper is that it is possible to extract a philosophically sophisti-
cated and politically interesting concept of the messianic from Benjamin. 
For it remains the case that the mortification of law carried out in Zur Kritik 
der Gewalt does not simply boil down to a naive antinomianism; that Ben-
jamins argument is far more subtle than any simple call for a radical de-
struction of the legal order.2 Indeed, if we read the text in conjunction with 
certain others in the Benjaminian oeuvre it becomes clear that it engages 
lucidly with a set of crucial, difficult questions about the status of law in 
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modernity. 
Benjamin begins his argument in Critique of Violence like a good 
Kantian: two opposing positions, axiomatically consistent in themselves, 
are shown to have constitutive blindspots, each of which corresponds to 
that of the other in a perfect, paradoxical symmetry. The natural law tradi-
tion, predicated on the claim that there is a transhistorical Good toward 
which human action can and should comport itself, finds the justification (or 
otherwise) of the use of violence in whether it is deployed for the sake of 
these just ends. Violence operates here as a sort of raw material,3 a 
natural fact of life that is not itself interpretable in terms of justice, legitima-
tion or legality; just means (violent or otherwise) are simply those that cor-
respond to just ends. Positive law, on the other hand, is predicated on the 
claim that there is no natural or given Good that the human being has ac-
cess to, is thus unable to justify violence with reference to the justness of 
ends, and so instead looks to the means themselves for legitimation of hu-
man action. Just means will produce just ends as a matter of course, and 
positive law therefore finds itself embroiled in a series of questions on the 
historical foundations and legal legitimation of state violence. 
Having set up the two sides of his antinomy, Benjamin moves to the 
claim that both positive and natural law are dependent on a paradox. It runs 
as follows: in both cases, justice must be found in an alignment between 
means and ends, where the attainment of one will establish legitimation 
through the guaranteed attainment of the other. And yet in either case, this 
can only be obtained through inquiry into one half of the nexus at the ex-
pense of leaving the other entirely undetermined. Both traditions are for 
Benjamin engaged in a kind of sleight of hand whereby a relation is claimed 
to be established between two terms, when what in fact takes place is sim-
ply the elimination (or bracketing out) of one of them. [If] positive law, as 
Benjamin puts it, is blind to the absoluteness of ends, natural law is 
equally so to the contingency of means.4 There is a double circularity in 
operation here that undermines the claim of either party to a coherent con-
cept of justice. Benjamins strategy, then, is to break this circular argu-
ment5 of the justification of means through sole reference to ends or the 
justification of ends through sole reference to means. Importantly, though, 
Benjamin does privilege one side of the antinomy: natural and positive law 
may be tied up together in double circularity, but Benjamin will nevertheless 
find his way through this circle by radicalising the basic theses of positive 
legal philosophy. This is because the distinction in positive law between 
sanctioned and un-sanctioned violence is meaningful,6 or at least that it is 
so in a legal sense. The real question for Benjamin is precisely what light 
the very intelligibility of this distinction throws upon the original problem of 
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violence. His interest in this text is not in the justification or justifiability of 
violence, then, but rather in the questions raised by the very fact that we 
make a distinction between just and unjust violence in the first place. His 
desired goal is not to resolve the antinomy of means and ends but rather to 
deploy it in the development of a philosophico-historical view of law7 that 
would completely undermine it. 
This is why the discussion turns to legal problems surrounding the le-
gitimation of certain forms of violence. It can be formulated as a general 
maxim of present-day European legislation, says Benjamin, that all the 
natural ends of individuals must collide with legal ends if pursued with a 
greater or lesser degree of violence.8 Individuals do not possess the legal 
right to use violence for the sake of their own ends; as in the Hobbessian 
vision, it is precisely the right to the use of force in obtaining its ends that 
the citizen gives up to the sovereign for the sake of its own protection. Thus 
the state sets up, in all areas where individual ends could be usefully pur-
sued by violence,9 a legal system in which these ends can be pursued by 
non-violent, sanctioned means. Benjamin goes on: From this maxim it fol-
lows that law sees violence in the hands of individuals as a danger under-
mining the legal system.10 The use of violence by individuals must be cur-
tailed by the state because only the state may have the monopoly on vio-
lence: violence, when not in the hands of the law, threatens it not by the 
ends that it may pursue but by its mere existence outside the law.11 Law 
must maintain the monopoly on violence if it wants to preserve its status as 
law, its very claim to legitimation. Violence threatens law not in spite but 
because of the fact that law has its origins in violence.12 Benjamin points to 
the figure of the great criminal and explains its historical ability to both hor-
rify and captivate the masses in precisely these terms. Such figures con-
front the violence of law with the threat of declaring a new law.13 This link 
between the violence of acting outside or above the law and the founda-
tional violence of positing a new legal order makes such figures intolerable 
to the state. It is what sees them exert their strange fascination over ordi-
nary citizens. 
Here we see one of the central oppositions of the text beginning to 
come to light: the distinction between lawmaking and law-preserving vio-
lence. Lawmaking violence is foundational; it is the performative violence of 
a new constitution or a declaration of independence. The violence here is 
that of inauguration, of the laws original setting-into-force. It is the violence 
of self-positing, the violence of an emergence ex nihilo of a le-
gal/social/political system. This violence operates, as Jacques Derrida 
points out, in the future anterior: it is violence that finds legitimation not in 
the past but in a not-yet-realised legal order on behalf of which it claims to 
░    The Creature Before the Law 83 
speak.14 It is violence that will have been just. Law-preserving violence, on 
the other hand, is violence carried out by an already-founded state: it is 
conservative and protective, designed to defend or fortify a pre-existing le-
gal order. It is violence that is deployable against uprising or a potentially 
lawmaking insurrection, but also simply the basic form of the day-to-day 
functioning of the legal system. Law is fortified every time a judges gavel 
comes down. 
The crucial point at this stage of Benjamins analysis is that these two 
forms of violence are not rigorously separable.15 The argument here is that 
law can never be fully constituted; that the process of legitimation can 
never reach an end; that every new legal event or legal decision works not 
just to preserve law but engages each time in a renewal of the inaugural 
lawmaking moment. The foundation of a legal order, on this account, would 
not only be an historical event that grants legitimation to the present, but 
rather the laws hidden, constant accompaniment. Part of the argument 
here is that legitimation is contingent upon a foundation of historically de-
termined, potentially contestable power structures; this means there is al-
ways the possibility, however small, of an uprising of lawmaking violence 
against the legal order. Each act of law-preserving violence, then, contains 
within it a defensive moment of lawmaking violence, where the legitimated 
regime re-posits itself as such. Law never quite shakes its original founding 
violence. It is always engaging in a kind of secret re-legitimation. 
Of course, this problem runs in both directions, for the purity of law-
making violence can itself be contaminated by the practical and administra-
tive constraints of law-preserving violence.16 Benjamin decries the decline 
of parliamentary democracy on these grounds, arguing that [w]hen the 
consciousness of the latent presence of [lawmaking] violence in a legal in-
stitution disappears, the institution falls into decay. Parliamentary democ-
racies, Benjamin says, offer the familiar, woeful spectacle because they 
have not remained conscious of the revolutionary forces to which they owe 
their existence; they lack the sense of the violence of their own origins, 
unsettled by the pure positing force of their own inauguration.17 Lawmak-
ing violence can call legitimation into question because it reveals the vio-
lence at its heart, so law-preserving violence turns away from its own origi-
nal lawlessness, from the antinomian (in a sense prenomian) force at its 
origin, fearing its potential for appropriation by insurrectionist forces.18 
Law-preserving forces thus find themselves in conflict with their own origi-
nal principal: for Benjamin, parliamentary democracy contains an unre-
solved, indeed irresolvable contradiction that over time has an entropic ef-
fect on its institutions. 
Benjamin points to the police as the modern face of this mutual infec-
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tion between lawmaking and law-preserving violence. If lawmaking violence 
is required to prove itself with political victory, and law-preserving violence 
is subject to the restriction that it may not set itself new ends,19 then the 
singular violence of the modern police force consists in its partial emanci-
pation from both of these conditions: ostensibly, the police are simply rep-
resentatives of law-preserving violence, but the specificity of the situations 
in which they intervene means that they must inevitably employ lawmaking 
violence on a situational basis. The refrain that it depends on the cop 
comes to mind here: there are countless legal situations in which police 
must exercise a certain discretionary power, making decisions on the 
ground that exceed strict legality, but that will have been legitimated (if, for 
instance, an inquiry takes place in future). Or, in a perhaps more insidious 
register, we should think here of the special powers that have been 
granted to police on the basis of the supposed exceptionality of the terrorist 
threat: the police intervene for security reasons in countless cases where 
no clear legal situation exists.20 It is worth re-emphasising that this is a 
particularly modern phenomenon, relating as it does to the separation of 
powers (and indeed to the ultimate impossibility of a pure separation). The 
gap between the legislative and executive, between lawmaking and law-
preserving power, only truly opens in modernity with the decline of the ab-
solute sovereign. For Benjamin, this gives the modern police force a para-
doxical sort of brutality: 
And though the police may, in particulars, everywhere appear the 
same, it cannot finally be denied that their spirit is less devastating 
where they represent, in absolute monarchy, the power of a ruler in 
which legislative and executive supremacy are united, than in de-
mocracies where their existence, elevated by no such relation, bears 
witness to the greatest conceivable degeneration of violence.21
The police, crossing the boundaries between lawmaking and law-
preserving violence, exemplify the decay of law in modernity, revealing 
precisely what is rotten22 in it (one thinks here of the filth  a Cockney 
slang term for the police). 
It is very important that Benjamin employs these motifs of rottenness 
and decay in making his critique of the disavowed violence of law. One is 
reminded in particular of Kafka. And of course, Benjamin himself wrote 
what remain some of the most perceptive works of Kafka criticism. In the 
most notable example of this work, he identifies Kafkas world as the world 
of offices and registries, of musty, shabby, dark rooms.23 Benjamins 
Kafka is the obscene Kafka, the Kafka who has Joseph K. discover his 
judges store of pornography in the courtroom, who has him seduced by his 
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lawyers petite, syndactylic mistress. Filth is the element of officials,24 
says Benjamin, and what he finds in Kafka is precisely a commitment to 
unpacking the implications of the thesis of a fundamental link between 
modern law and filth, decay, rottenness. Importantly, the claim is not as 
simple as the law is rotten  this would be one way of framing the argu-
ment of the childish anarchism25 that Benjamin himself ridicules  but 
rather relies on a more sophisticated argument about the relation between 
modern law, sovereignty and citizens. We can begin to see its outlines if we 
turn to the section in Critique of Violence on the death penalty. 
Speaking of those who opposed critics of the death penalty, Benjamin 
writes that they felt, perhaps without knowing why and probably involuntar-
ily, that an attack on capital punishment assails, not legal measure, not 
laws, but law itself in its origin.26 He goes on: 
For if violence, crowned fate, is the origin of law, then it may be 
readily supposed that where the highest violence, that over life and 
death, occurs in the legal system, the origins of law jut manifestly 
and fearsomely into existence []. For in the exercise of violence 
over life and death more than in any other legal act, law reaffirms it-
self.27
In the terms Benjamin will introduce a few pages later, the death penalty is 
perhaps the most brutal example of mythical violence, or violence that is 
immediate and in an important sense bloody.28 In mythical violence, or 
bloody power over mere life for its own sake,29 what shows itself is the 
original hold law has over life itself. Mere life in Benjamin is a figure of 
fallen life, of sinful, dirty life; it is the distorted life of the hunchback, bent 
down by some unnamable cosmic burden. Benjamins claim here is that the 
space opened up in modernity at the heart of law (as exemplified in the im-
possibility of any full exclusion or full inclusion of lawmaking violence into 
law-preserving violence) is in fact the site of a particular form of our subjec-
tion to it. Eric Santner, whose recent work on political theology represents a 
singularly clear and refreshing approach to Benjamins philosophical pro-
ject, provides a useful explication of these arguments: 
What manifests itself as the laws inner decay is the fact that the rule 
of law is, in the final analysis, without ultimate justification or legiti-
mation, that the very space of juridical reason within which the rule 
of law obtains is established and sustained by a dimension of force 
and violence that, as it were, holds the place of those missing foun-
dations.30
This dimension of force and violence represents the obscene dimension 
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of law, the zone in which there is a slippage between law preserving and 
lawmaking violence.31 This is the site of what Santner will call our crea-
turely tie to law (another way of framing the subjection of mere life as de-
scribed by Benjamin), which is something more than our simple answerabil-
ity to or responsibility before the legal order. Following both Beatrice 
Hanssen and Julia Lupton,32 Santner points out that the word creature de-
rives from the Latin creatura, which signifies a being undergoing a process 
of creation. It is, Santner says, not so much the name of a determinate 
state of being as the signifier of an ongoing exposure, of being caught up in 
the process of becoming creature through the dictates of divine alterity.33 
The theological dimension of the term is crucial: a creature is first and 
foremost a created being, a being that lives in thrall to a sovereign (the 
German term Kreatur has the same connotations). As the history of the 
term progressed, however, it came to be synonymous with not simply 
Gods creations but rather with particularly monstrous strains of those crea-
tions: in this usage, it can evoke compassion, pity or even horror; it signifies 
a being marked by an indeterminacy that puts the borders between particu-
lar life forms in question. The creature thus becomes a being that dwells in 
the gaps between species, a threat to the very system of classification. And 
it is precisely this double meaning that Santner works with, developing a 
Benjaminian concept of the creature as a liminal being (and indeed as a 
being that emerges in liminal, exceptional situations) that finds itself bio-
logically tied to sovereign power. 
A key claim here is that this particular form of creatureliness is particu-
lar to humans; that human beings are not just creatures among other crea-
tures but are in a sense more creaturely34 than non-human animals. 
This is because the creaturely dimension of life opens up contemporane-
ously with the dimension of sovereignty and law. Indeed, one could make a 
case for the argument that modern humans are themselves more crea-
turely than pre-moderns, because of the particular tensions instilled by 
Enlightenment secularism. Remember Benjamins remark on the particular 
violence of the modern police force, whose spirit is more devastating be-
cause it does not represent the will of any absolute sovereign. As with 
Freuds primal father who becomes more powerful in his absence, whose 
death casts a shadow of guilt upon all of his descendents, secular law has 
a peculiar biopolitical hold over its subjects not in spite but because of its 
lack of ultimate foundation. Or rather: secular law captures the mere life of 
its subjects in a novel way, forcing it to stand in as its new, highly ambigu-
ous foundation. Human life itself is forced in modernity to bear the burden 
of the laws own ungroundedness. 
In a neat double pun, Santner refers to the ibidinal35 economy of the 
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law and its ex-citational power over the human creature, arguing that 
there is a dimension of disavowed obscenity operating alongside or be-
neath those performative events by which a human being is initiated into a 
particular symbolic economy. Citation is understood here in terms of the 
problem of authority and its relation to desire; the claim is not only that the 
human creature is wracked by ibidinal urges that it can never properly sat-
isfy, but that this basic impossibility gives institutions a paradoxical violent 
power. Think here of military hazings, the Russian Dedovschina, the fag-
ging system in British public schools or even the obscure sexuality of an 
academic degree granting ceremony: these are all examples of the way in 
which institutional systems discharge the tensions created by the un-
groundedness of law. Law in modernity constitutes itself on the basis of an 
originary violence in which the very resources of legitimacy link up with a 
power of suspension and disruption.36 In this paradoxical moment, the law 
traverses an intimate zone at the heart of the human and captures some-
thing there that the subject itself cannot: its mere life, the simple fact of its 
being alive. This is why Giorgio Agamben writes that a theory of the state 
of exception is the preliminary condition for any definition of the relation that 
binds, and, at the same time, abandons the living being to law.37 Mere or 
creaturely life is life that pleads guilty for the sake of sustaining the law, 
providing a hidden support for its obscene, exceptional dimension.38
As always with Benjamin, one has to make some difficult interpretive 
decisions regarding the status of Critique of Violence. The piece is explic-
itly political, but as it progresses it enters a theological register, and ends 
with an unsettling paean to the power of divine violence. Derrida (and he is 
far from alone in doing so) responds to this invocation of the bloodless yet 
expiatory powers of divine violence and its capacity to disrupt the workings 
of mythical violence with a kind of horror. What he finds perhaps almost 
unbearable in this text39 is the possibility that it could tempt the reader to 
interpret the Nazi final solution in terms of a manifestation of this divine 
violence. When one thinks of the gas chambers and the cremation ovens, 
says Derrida, this allusion to an extermination that would be expiatory be-
cause bloodless must cause one to shudder.40 He goes on to invoke both 
Schmitt and Heidegger, and asks whether there could be complicity be-
tween their discourses, that of Benjamin, and the worst.41 Yet if one con-
siders the fact that Benjamin spent his life in a sustained and explicit intel-
lectual struggle against fascism, indeed that Benjamin probably committed 
suicide to avoid being captured by the Gestapo, then this starts to look like 
a strange move on Derridas part (and one that betrays an uncharacteristic 
lack of charity). At the same time, however, it is nevertheless the case that 
Benjamins rhetoric still has the power to induce a kind of horror on behalf 
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of even the most sympathetic reader, as when Benjamin, now identifying 
mythical violence with all legal violence,42 defines its divine antithesis as 
follows: 
This very task of destruction poses again, in the last resort, the 
question of a pure immediate violence that might be able to call a 
halt to mythical violence. Just as in all spheres God opposes myth, 
mythical violence is confronted by the divine. And the latter consti-
tutes its antithesis in all respects. If mythical violence is lawmaking, 
divine violence is law-destroying; if the former sets boundaries, the 
latter boundlessly destroys them; if mythical violence brings at once 
guilt and retribution, divine power only expiates; if the former threat-
ens, the latter strikes; if the former is bloody, the latter is lethal with-
out spilling blood.43
First of all, it is worth contextualising this rhetoric of destruction, coming as 
it does from a young Benjamin writing in the politically, economically and 
culturally virulent environment of postwar Berlin (with massive inflation, 
growing radicalism on the Right and Left, unprecedented cultural and artis-
tic production, etc.). Perhaps more importantly, however, the metaphysical 
and indeed speculative language of the text itself actually precludes any 
neat reduction to a concrete political program, and, with its denunciation of 
myth, especially any Far Right appropriation. Similarly, it seems naive or 
simply too easy to read Benjamins account of divine violence in terms of 
the glorification of the purifying powers of mass violence or a call to arms 
against the legal institutions of liberal democracy.44 The text is far too am-
biguous, far too esoteric in both style and content for it to be reducible to a 
manifesto for any concrete politics. My claim, then, is that Critique of Vio-
lence is both less and more political than it may seem on a first reading: 
less because it is not reducible to any concrete politics; more because, 
unlike any simple glorification of mass violence or call for the destruction of 
law, it actually has interesting (if largely implicit) political consequences. 
The best place to turn here is back to Benjamins Kafka essay. In par-
ticular, we can turn to its passages on Kafkas animals and creatures, em-
bedded in which is a complex and compelling theory of the relation be-
tween animality and creatureliness that can help us unpack the implications 
of Benjamins theory of law. On Kafkas animals: 
One can understand, then, why Kafka never tired of hearing about 
the forgotten from animals. They are not the goal, to be sure, but 
one cannot do without them.45
Can't one see the animals in The Burrow or the giant mole ponder 
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as they dig in? Yet this thinking is extremely flighty. Irresolutely, it 
flits from one worry to the next; it nibbles at every anxiety with the 
fickleness of despair [...]. This much is certain: of all of Kafkas crea-
tures, the animals have the greatest opportunity for reflection. What 
corruption is in the law, anxiety is in their thinking. It messes a situa-
tion up, yet it is the only hopeful thing about it.46
On his creatures: 
Odradek stays alternately in the attic, on the staircase, in the corri-
dors, and in the hall. So it prefers the same places as the court of 
law which investigates guilt. Attics are the places of discarded, for-
gotten objects. Perhaps having to appear before a court of justice 
gives rise to a feeling similar to that with which one approaches 
trunks in the attic which have been locked up for years.47
Odradek is the form which things assume in oblivion. They are dis-
torted. The cares of a family man, which no one can identify, are 
distorted; the bug, which we know all to well represents Gregor 
Samsa, is distorted; the big animal, half lamb, half kitten, for which 
the butchers knife might be a release, is distorted. These Kafka 
figures are connected by a long series of figures with the prototype 
of distortion: a hunched back.48
The animal has an essential flightiness, a constant flitting of consciousness 
that prevents it from concentrating its attention. This is illustrated by Kafka 
in The Burrow, whose protagonist lives in a continuous state of hyper-
tense anxiety.49 And yet, as Benjamin indicates, Kafkas animals seem to 
possess a wisdom that is fascinating despite its near total inaccessibility to 
human reflection. This wisdom, it seems, is part of the happiness of Kafkas 
animals, and it exists in uneasy juxtaposition to their anxious dispositions: 
Sometimes, says the protagonist of The Burrow, I lie down and roll 
about in the passage with pure joy.50 Animals are exceptional in Kafka in 
that they display a joy in pure existing that is not readily available to the 
other figures in his taxonomy (his creatures, humans, angels and gods all 
carry various burdens). This beatific wisdom is what makes animals a cru-
cial part of Benjamin and Kafkas modernist messianism, for it represents a 
sort of untapped possibility for human life. Kakfas animals are the reposi-
tory of what Benjamin calls the forgotten, and the ethical demand he finds 
in Kafka emanates from this forgotten animal substratum. 
Kafkas creatures are distinct from animals in that they are figures of 
biological distortion. Odradek  an apparently immortal creature that looks 
like a flat star-shaped spool for thread51  is paradigmatic here, both for 
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its uncanny appearance and for the sense of quiet foreboding it brings with 
it. Can he possibly die? asks the narrator who appears to be its owner (or 
who appears, at least, to have taken on a burden of responsibility for the 
creature). Anything that dies has had some kind of aim in life, some kind of 
activity, which has worn out; but that does not apply to Odradek.52 If one 
considers the half kitten, half lamb53 crossbreed that plagues another of 
Kafkas narrators, which seems to possess only those talents of the cat and 
the sheep that cancel each other out in practice, then it becomes clear that 
this dreadful absence of purpose may be a common property shared by his 
creatures. The other is quasi-humanity, as displayed in the crossbreeds 
look of human understanding54 and indicated by Odradeks ability to 
speak. Kafkas creatures, Benjamin argues, are linked to the hunchback, a 
figure that is always present but never directly mentioned in his works. The 
link here is burden, and Benjamin will draw an analogy between the dis-
torted life of creatures like Odradek, the repeated images in Kafka of the 
man who bows his head far down on his chest: the fatigue of the court offi-
cials, the noise affecting the doormen in the hotel, the low ceiling facing the 
visitors in the gallery55 and the severe heaviness of what drives his hu-
man protagonists. 
One could schematise the relation between these figures by saying: 
the creature is the result of the forgetting of the animal. On this account, the 
creature is the offspring of a lack of or failure in relation: not simply a half-
way point between human and animal, but rather a figure of the humans 
denial of its own animality, a kind of return of the repressed in intensified 
form. Benjamin: because the most forgotten source of strangeness is our 
body  one's own body  one can understand why Kafka called the cough 
that erupted from within him the animal. It was the vanguard of the great 
herd.56 The human, on this account, possesses an animality that it cannot 
fully assimilate, a life that is unforgettable to the extent that it is impossible 
to remember. The animal subsists in the opacity of the body, in ones ob-
scure encasement in a biological system; the creature is what emerges as 
a result of the refusal of this haunting animal life.57 This is why we find 
Benjamin characterising the Kafkan ethic in terms of attentiveness, under-
stood as a particular sort of relation with the animal substratum of everyday 
life. Attentiveness would be the name for the maintenance of this relation to 
the opacity of ones own animal life: a prayer of the soul made on behalf 
of all living beings.58
What does this tell us about Benjamins theory of law? As we have 
seen, Benjamins claim is that the exceptional dimension of law finds its 
support in mere life, which stands in and pleads guilty to supply its missing 
foundation. We can now supplement this claim by saying that the refusal or 
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failure of relation between human and animal  which is what provokes the 
emergence of mere or creaturely life  operates as the other side of this 
subjection to the disavowed violence of law. In fleeing or refusing animal 
life, we become creaturely subjects tied to the exceptional dimension of 
law. This is to say that the denial of the animal is a condition of the support 
of the laws exceptionality; that we are subject to the obscene, supplemen-
tary dimension of law insofar as we fail to maintain the proper relation to 
our own animality. Which is itself to say: if the obscene dimension of law is 
supported by creaturely life, and creaturely life emerges out of a failure in, 
or refusal of, the relation between human and animal, then it follows that an 
intervention into our ontology of human and animal life could be the catalyst 
for a new, non-violent relation to law. This would represent a release not 
from law as such, but from our biopolitical tie to the laws obscene dimen-
sion. 
We are now in a position to understand precisely what Benjamin eluci-
dates with his concept of divine violence. Crucial here is the claim (which is 
actually a microcosm of his entire theory of divine violence) that the 
hunchback will disappear with the coming of the messiah.59 The 
hunchback, as we have seen, appears in Benjamins work as the paradigm 
of mere or creaturely life. Its life is distorted, fallen: the clearest possible 
exemplification of the creaturely dimension of the human, weighed down by 
the obscene dimension of law. Divine violence, synonymous with the com-
ing of the messiah, would therefore represent an intervention into precisely 
this dimension of human subjectivity. This is why it is does not bring either 
guilt or retribution (which is part of the dialectic of mere or creaturely life), 
and instead only expiates. It also explains why it is a pure or bloodless vio-
lence: if mythical violence seizes human subjectivity through the bloody 
capture of mere life, then divine violence intervenes into this seizure and 
releases human life from its subjection to the rottenness of law. When Ben-
jamin refers to divine violence as law-destroying, then, it is important to re-
alise that what is destroyed here is not law in toto but simply our creaturely 
attachment to it. Thus too the link, clear in Benjamin and insisted upon by 
certain of his commentators, between redemption and a fundamental 
change in the human/animal relation. One thinks here in particular of 
Hanssens claim that humanity itself might be rescued in the image of 
animality,60 or the assertion from Agamben that on the last day, the rela-
tions between animals and men will take on a new form, and [...] man him-
self will be reconciled with his animal nature.61 Divine violence would re-
deem humanity from the obscene dimension of law through a suspension 
of the creaturely dimension of human subjectivity. It is the figure of a re-
lease effected by a reconfiguration of the relation between human and ani-
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mal. 
It is evident that there is something unexpected about Benjamins 
messianism. It is that the messianic in Benjamin is a figure of not simply 
redemption, but of redemption from salvation. Like that of Kafkas, Benja-
mins messiah is the messiah who comes by not coming, who comes only 
when he is no longer necessary.62 Divine violence, that is, represents not 
the arrival of the divine on earth, but rather the earths abandonment by the 
divine. The transformation of the relation between human and animal that 
takes place in divine violence is the precise opposite of a rescue of the 
former from the latter; divine violence would not redeem the human from its 
animality as much as redeem it to its animality. What Benjamin seeks is not 
a passage from earthly oblivion into the Kingdom but rather an earthly re-
demption from the desire or need to enter the Kingdom in the first place. 
Indeed, one could even say that there is a definite (if decidedly postsecular) 
atheism in Benjamins messianism.63 Divine violence represents a kind of 
cut whereby the profane world finally separates from the transcendent. It is 
not an event in which what was profane becomes sacred and what was 
lost is found again, but the irreparable loss of the lost, the definitive pro-
fanity of the profane.64 It effects not the destruction of law but the shatter-
ing of our subjective ties to its obscene underside, not the end of the world 
but the passing of the figure of the world.65 In the terms of Hölderlins cou-
plet, the spirit of Benjamins historical-philosophical theory of law can be 
summarised as follows: if it is true that the saving power grows alongside 
the danger, then the danger also grows where the saving power lies. Re-
demption consists in a release from this very dialectic of danger and salva-
tion.66
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